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THE CONFESSIONS OF A COLD WARRIOR:

CLINTON P. ANDERSON AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1972
J.

ON

SAMUEL WALKER

1970, Clinton P. Anderson, New Mexico's senior
representative in the U.S. Senate, rose to address his colleagues on
an issue that was convulsing the nation. The previous evening,
President Richard M. Nixon had announced his decis,ion to use
American troops to destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cam~
bodia. Anderson, while remarking that he seldom spoke out 011
foreign policy matters and admitting that he lacked any special
expertise on the situation in Southeast Asia, felt compelled to express publicly his unequivocal opposition to the Cambodian incursion. Nixon's action, he said, pointed the United States "on a
new, dangerous, and potentially very tragic course." He rejected
the president's assertion that invading Cambodia was basically a
defensive measure, and argued that it would widen the war. He
predicted that enemy troops driven from their Cambodian sanctuaries would exert greater pressure on the capital city of Phnom
Penh, resulting in new and urgent pleas from Premier Lon N61's
government for increased American assistance. Anderson harbored
grave doubts that the Cambodian offensive could be "a clean, fast,
surgical military operation," and declared: "War in Asia is like
quicksand. . . . It is tempting to believe that a quick raid into
heretofore forbidden territory could hasten the end of the Asian
conflict, but, sadly, Vietnam has taught us that this cannot be."
Nixon's decision, he added, raised profound constitutional questions about the roles of the president and Congress in making war.
Confessing that he was "as blameworthy as anyone" for permitting
the executive branch to involve the United States so deeply in
MAY I,
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Anderson conferring with Lyndon B. Johnson aboard Air Force One. Photo courtesy
of the Clinton.P. An~ersonAgency.
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Southeast Asia without a declaration of war,the New Mexican
urged that Congress reassert its constitutional authority and assume
its proper responsibilities in the conduct of American foreign
policy.l
Anderson's remarks were but a small part of the storm of angry
protest that followed the announcement of the Cambodian invasion; many other voices were more prominent, more eloquent,
and more impassioned. But his views were still noteworthy because
they represented a sharp contrast with the positions he had taken
on foreign affairs during most of the cold war era. As Harry S.
Truman's Secretary of Agriculture from 1945 to 1948, he' played
a role, albeit a secondary one, in the formulation and execution of
American diplomatic policies that eventually culminated in the
Vietnamese imbroglio, After his election to the Senate in 1948, he
continued to support America's cold war posture and willingly consigned primary responsibility for foreign affairs to the chief execu- .
tive. For Anderson, as for most Americans, it reqUired the magnitude of the tragedy in Vietnam to force a reexamination of longheld but too little questioned ideas about foreign policy. The war.
in Southeast Asia prompted him to modify his world outlook to
the extent that, in 1970, he expressed regret for his own and the
entire Truman administration's TOle in contributing to the tensions
that produced the cold war. In a broad sense, the metamorphosis
in Anderson's thinking reflected the widespread discontent with
American foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In a
more narrow sense, it evolved from the private reappraisal by a
cold warrior who was flexible and open-minded enough to reconsider positions he had espoused during a generation in public office.
Anderson's cold war views were rooted in his distrust of the
Soviet Union and c;ncern about the spread of communism. In
January 1945, while serving as congressman from New Mexico,
he told a Wooster, Ohio, dinner meeting that he disapproved of
Russia's territorial claims in eastern Poland and worried that an
unfair settlement would jeopardize chances for a lasting peace.
One of his first decisions after becoming Secretary of Agriculture
in June 1945 was to stop shipment of butter and fat products des..:
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tined for Soviet ports. Although his motives were not malevolent,
he later wrote, such actions aroused Soviet suspicions and fueled
increasing American-Russian tensions. 2
Anderson's antipathy toward the Soviet was most obvious in the
stand he took on the question of sharing atomic information with
them. He made his position clear in a cabinet meeting on September 21, 1945. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson opened that
day's discussion by pleading for free exchange of scientific information about atomic energy among members of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union. Since scientific knowledge was
already widely disseminated and Russia would be able to develop
its own atomic bomb within a few years, Stimson recommended
that the United States share its expertise as a step toward international control of atomic energy. If America flaunted its atomic
supremacy and failed to invite the Soviets into an atomic partnership based on mutual trust, he feared, an arms race that threatened
the future of civilization would occur. Stimson's ideas elicited a
mixed response from the cabinet. Among those supporting his
position was Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, who carefully distinguished between general scientific information and
specific facts about the design and manufacturing processes involved in building the atomic bomb. He pointed out that the subject under discussion was the exchange of basic data and not disclosure of the secret of how to produce atomic weapons. 3
Anderson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal were
the most outspoken opponents of Stimson's proposals. Both ignored
the distinction drawn by Wallace and contended that America
should not yield its atomic secrets. Forrestal commented that the
bomb was "the property of the American people" and the knowledge of how to build it should not be revealed without their consent. Anderson argued that sharing atomic information would be
a major political blunder. The American people would never accept it, he said, and the preSident's prestige and ability to lead the
country would be gravely impaired. Anderson was sharply critical
of Soviet behavior, declaring that Russia was subjugating Mongolia, Manchuria, and other areas. 4
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The cabinet debate ended inconclusively, and Truman asked
those attending to submit their. views to him in writing. Anderson
responded with a long letter that expanded on his remarks at the
meeting. He continued to base his argument on the false premise
that supporters of Stimson's position favored disclosure of the secret
of the atomic bomb. He reiterated his central point that Truman
would lose the "confidence, love, and respect of the American
people" if he delivered atomic. data to Russia. The Agriculture
Secretary disputed the assertion that the Soviets could develop
their own bomb within a short time because he doubted that their
technological and mechanical aptitude could match American inventive genius. He was also skeptical that Russia would prove to
be a trustworthy friend of the United States. "If the Russians did
not trust us in time of war when we were their allies," he asked, .
"what reason do we have to believe that they would be our friends
in time of peace?" Anderson not only submitted his own letter,
but also helped Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson and president pro·
tempore of the Senate Kenneth McKellar prepare their opinions
for the president. Vinson and McKellar sought Anderson's assistance because he had spent time at the atomic laboratory in Los
Alamos, New Mexico, but he later confessed that his experience
there had not given him special scientific insight into the problem.
Truman never made a clearcut decision on sharing atomic information, but uncertainty, inertia, and increasing American-Soviet
discord effectively settled the debate in favor of those who opposed
Stimson's position. 5
As escalatingworld tensions developed into full-fledged cold war, .
Anderson stood squarely behind America's firm posture toward the
Soviet Union. He applauded Truman for dismissing Henry Wal~
lace from the cabinet for publicly airing his doubts about American
foreign policy, In March 1947, after the president enunciated what
soon became known as the Truman Doctrine, the Agriculture
Secretary reported that "we are all supporting him as vigorously as
we know how and encouraging him to stand his grounds."6 A short
time later, Truman urged Anderson to do what he could to send
more wheat to Italy in an effort to influence Its voters· to elect anti-
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communist candidates. The New Mexican complied by ordering
wheat bound for South America shipped to Italy instead, where
it arrived just before the election and was distributed in cars clearly
marked with American flags. The Agriculture Secretary strongly
backed the Marshall Plan. He asked the House Foreign Affairs
Committee to approve it not only because it would aid farmers by
increasing exports but also because "the implications of the program ... involve the future of democracy in Europe, the strength
of our allies on that continent, and in fact, the very peace of the
world."7
Anderson resigned from the cabinet in May I 948, and took his
seat in the Senate the following year. His opinions about foreign
policy remained unchanged; he had not tailored his views as Agriculture Secretary merely to conform with the administration he
served. Throughout the pre-Vietnam era, he stood in the mainstream of American thinking about foreign affairs and endorsed a
number of corollaries that grew from American perceptions about
the nature of the cold war. He believed that communism was
monolithic and that Marxist movements around the globe were a
part of the Soviet drive for world conquest. Drawing on the "lessons of Munich," he warned against appeasement and held that
America must take prompt, firm, and if necessary, forceful action
to halt communist expansion. The Soviets and their allies, he insisted, respected only strength. Anderson accepted the wisdom of
the domino theory and thought that communist aggression ultimately threatened American security and well being. "I think
there's no question but what the Russians are doing everything
they can to use up our manpower and our resources in a war with
China," he wrote during the Korean conflict. "Naturally, if they
could accomplish that and wear us out in China, Iran, Iraq, [and]
Burma, they would then be able to overrun all of Europe at their
convenience ... and having overrun Europe, Asia and other parts
of the world, we would find ourselves in a most difficult situation."8
Convinced that international communism threatened American
national security and the future of the free world, Anderson maintained that the president should be allowed wide latitude in the
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conduct of foreign policy. In part, his willingness to acknowledge
executive prerogatives stemmed from his limited interest and lack
of expertise in international affairs. He preferred to concentrate
on domestic issues while leaving diplomatic matters largely to the
chief executive. When questioned about American aid to Poland
by a constituent in 1961, he replied that Presidents Dwight D.
Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy were responsible for sending
assistance there and added: "Whether they were wise or foolish
in doing that is not my problem."9
Anderson had other, more compelling reasons for deferring to
presidential authority in international relations; he believed that
the constitution granted the chief executive broad powers in that
area and undue congressional interference could endanger the
welfare of the country. A staunch advocate of bipartisanship, his
ideas about executive supremacy in diplomatic affairs applied as
much to Eisenhower as to Democratic presidents. He opposed a
constitutional amendment championed by Senator John Bricker
during thel950s that sought to check the president's power to
make executive agreements with foreign countries and to prevent
treaties from interfering in domestic affairs. The Bricker amendment, Anderson wrote, "would hamper the President in his Constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs." He informed its
supporters that he thought the president "should have my support
in this important field of foreign relations and ... I should not.
try to tie his hands." In keeping with those convictions, the New
Mexican voted in favor of congressional resolutions allowing the
president wide discretion in dealing with crisis in the Taiwan
Strait in 1955 and the Middle East in 1957.10
Although most Americans accepted the same basic assumptions
as Anderson about world affairs, there were important shades of
opinion within the prevailing cold war consensus. His position was
not entirely compatible with any single point of view. He rejected
the isolationist tendencies and Asia-first emphasis of such leading
Republican spokesmen as Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft, and William Knowland. Anderson felt greatest affinity for the ideas of
liberal internationalists who denounced colonialism, favored arms
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control and disarmament, and argued that economic assistance was
was more effective in containing communism than was excessive
military aid. Yet he frequently joined fiscal conservatives in slashing executive requests for foreign aid expenditures. In 1956, he
voted for a proposal of Republican Senator Styles Bridges to terminate aid to Yugoslavia. His reason, Anderson explained, was
that wool sent to clothe needy children had been used for fancy
anny unifonns instead. He preferred to spend money for domestic
programs such as social security rather than wasteful foreign assistance. He taunted those who claimed that "the Treasury can stand
aid for Tito, but it cannot stand aid for grandma."ll
Until the Vietnam war forced a major reassessment in his thinking, Anderson's ideas about foreign affairs underwent a significant
change in only one area-atomic energy. Because of the importance
of the atomic industry in New Mexico, he eagerly sought appointment to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy after his election
to the Senate. His interest in that assignment, he later wrote, "was
as natural for me as the attraction to military affairs for a senator
from, say, Georgia or Texas, where military bases have proliferated." He secured a seat on the Joint Committee in 1951, and
three years later became its chainnan. In 1955, Anderson headed
the congressional delegation to the International Conference on
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva, Switzerland. His
observations and experiences there convinced him that the United
States should be more willing to share basic scientific atomic information and playa greater role in fostering worldwide development
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 12
In an article written for the New Yorle Times after his return
from Geneva, Anderson outlined his ideas about sharing atomic
information. The position he took in 1955 in many ways contradicted arguments he had made on the same subject a decade earlier.
He suggested that the situation had changed since the end of
World War II, when interest in atomic energy centered on its
military uses. Now, however, a number of nations were making
significant progress in developing atomic power for peaceful ai
plitations. Anderson recommended that the United States, while
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carefully guarding military secrets, should more rapidly declassify
and more willingly share basic atomic data. In that way, it would
playa leading role in exploiting the atom's vast potential for constructive purposes because "the exchange of fundamental scientific
information is the very lifeblood of scientific progress." The New
Mexican was particularly impressed with Soviet achieyements displayed at Geneva, and admitted that Russia was nO't "slavishly
imitating our own atomic program" and had "demonstrated great
originality." Essentially, he was advocating the same position on
exchanging scientific data taken by Henry Stimson, Henry Wallace, and others he had opposed in 1945. He even echoed a favorite
phrase of Wallace's when he cautioned Americans against a "Maginot Line philosophy" of clinging to a false sense of security while
being surpassed by foreign countries in scientific advancement. 18
At the same time that Anderson was urging freer exchange of
scientific information, he was calling for a halt to the arms race
and steps toward nuclear disarmament. He appealed for international cooperation on atomic energy to "raise the standard of living
throughout the world" and "diminish tensions arising from inter~
national rivalries." He recognized that under existing conditions,
competing nations were unlikely to agree to destroy their stockpiles
of atomic weapons and noted that resolving the issue of mutual
inspection was "very difficult, if not impossible." But Anderson
argued that important progress toward world' peace and survival
would be ensured if nuclear powers would "disarm the future" by
refraining from developing new and more awesome weapons. Then
modem technology could be applied for constructive purposes and
"a war-weary world might achieve in time a fonn of disarmament
by obsolescence."14
Despite the urgency of his plea for arms control, Anderson saw
little prospect for its implementation' "until we find ways and
means of' cracking the. Iron Curtain." He thought the United
States h.ad been ttmore generous than any nation in history" in its
proposals to forestall an arms race, but it had been constantly frustrated by Soviet intransigence. His hopes for rmclear disarmamerit
and his adrriiration for Russian scientific achievement had not
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moderated his distrust of the Soviet Union. The strain of idealism
in Anderson's thinking was always tempered by his perceptions of
existing world realities. 15
When the Soviet Union proposed a nuclear test ban treaty in
March 1960, Anderson responded negatively. The Russians agreed
to a prohibition of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, oceans, and
outer space/vas well as underground explosions that recorded 4-75
or above on a seismic scale. Underground tests below that level
would be halted for five years. Anderson objected to the Soviet
offer because it did not clearly permit nuclear blasts for peaceful
purposes and did not specify how many on-site inspections would
be allowed annually. He was also troubled by the five-year ban on
all types of nuclear tests because he feared that American laboratories would close and scientists would disperse, making it difficult
to resume a viable nuclear program if the treaty were not extended.
Anderson's grave reservations about the proposed agreement reflected his suspicion of Soviet motives. But he also worried about
the harmful impact such an accord would have on the economy of
New Mexico. He pointed out to editors of the state's leading nev,'spapers that the treaty, if consummated, "would mean that we
would have less need for the laboratories at Los Alamos and Livermore, much less need for Sandia Corporation and the South Albuquerque Works, and absolutely no need for Project Gnome at
Carlsbad." Although distrust of Russia was the overriding factor
in Anderson's criticism of the test ban proposal, he was also influencedby the compulsions inherent in the military-industrial
complex. 16
Despite his opposition to the Russian proposal for a nuclear test
ban, Anderson still hoped for progress toward arms control and
disarmament. He firmly supported and actively worked for Senate
approval of the limited test ban on which the United States, Russia,
and other nations agreed in 1963. It prohibited nuclear' blasts in
the atmosphere, oceans, and outer space but placed no restrictions
on underground testing. Anderson helped ease the minds of his
Senate colleagues on scientific and technical questionsab6ti.t the
treaty. He won praise from chairman J William Fulbright for
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clarifying issues and reducing confusion in the hearings of the
Foreign Relations Committee. "I think the committee, the Senate,
and the country owe the Senator from New Mexico a great debt,"
Fulbright declared. From Anderson's point of view, the limited test
ban treaty had many attractive features. It represented a positive
step towards arms control and promised to curtail nuclear pollution
of the earth's atmosphere without adversely affecting American
security or threatening the economic well-being of New Mexico.
In fact, several nuclear installations in New Mexico received extra
funds for research and development deemed necessary by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to make certain the treaty would not undermine
'
America's defense posture. 17
Anderson's support for the limited test ban treaty in no way
implied that he had modified his assumptions about the cold war.
The gradual metamorphosis in his thinking occurred only after
the United States became deeply involved in Vietnam. His initial
reactions to American policies in Southeast Asia were entirely
consistent with his overall'position regarding foreign affairs. Anderson was gravely concerned with the dilemma that confronted the
United States when France stood on the verge of defeat in Vietnam
in 1954. He did not want America to underwrite French colonialism in Indochina andcontended that military assistance would
be effective only if France guaranteed independence to Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia. He adamantly opposed sending American
ground troops to Southeast Asia, declaring that "the American
people want no coffins back from Indochina," But he worried about
the spread of communism in Asia and feared that the fall of Indochina would undermine the security of Thailand, Burma, Malaya,
and Indonesia. The only way to halt the "communist menace,"
Anderson believed, was to give Asian peoples sufficient incentive
to fight their own battles. The United States could supply military
equipment and advisors, but the effort would be futile unless lithe
people of South Asia recognize that Soviet imperialism can be as
degrading and dangerousas the old colonialism hasbeen."18 .
.
Anderson found Ngo DinhDiem's dictatorial rille in South
Vietnam as distasteful as French imperialism. In September 1'963;
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just before Diem's death, he cosponsored a Senate resolution that
called for termination of economic and military assistance to South
Vietnam unless its government "abandons policies of repression
against its own people and makes a determined effort to regain their
support." But Anderson's concern about the type of regime the
United States upheld in South Vietnam did not prevent him from
backing Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war. In part, his position derived from his affection and respect for Johnson, who he
thought had the ability and experience to "make a remarkably fine
President." Even more important was his continuing deference to
presidential authority in world affairs. He remained convinced
that constitutional jurisdiction and access to expert advisory opinion
made foreign policy "an area largely and properly dominated by
the President." Finally, Anderson believed that the United States
had an obligation to defend its client state from "aggression encouraged from outside South Viet-Nam." Not only would it be
wrong to abandon America's ally, he wrote in 1965, but also "if
we pulled out of Southeast Asia, Red China would take over and
then endanger areas as far away as the Philippine Islands." The
New Mexican's thinking embodied his basic cold war credos; respect for presidential supremacy in foreign affairs, adherence to
the idea of monolithic communism and the domino theory, and a
belief that the United States must act firmly to thwart communist
aggression. 19
Anderson maintained his hawkish stance in the face of rising
protests against the war across the nation in general and from his
New Mexican constituents in particular. After President Johnson's
State of the Union address in January 1966, he commented: "I
like very much the assurance we are not going to walk awayfrom
the situation in Vietnam. We proved that in Korea and the results
have been good." He approved of American bombing in Vietnam
as a means to shorten the war and thought that if the United States
intensified the bombing, "a favorable result could be much earlier
than if we are soft." Although he hoped that negotiations might
produce a settlement, he doubted that the communists seriously
wanted a fairpeace. 2o
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But Anderson was not oblivious to arguments against the war.
On one occasion in 1966, he refused Johnson's request to make a
Senate speech asserting that the cost of the war would not require
any sacrinces from the American people or undermine the stability
of the economy. When he ran for reelection the same year, he
parried questions about his views on· Vietnam with the noncommittal answer that "I want to see the war end." Although he
believed that most New Mexicans supported the administration
and agreed with his position, he became increasingly perplexed
about what the best course of action' was in Vietnam. He opposed
unilateral withdrawal but also worded that further escalation
might bring Russia and China into the war. He saw little prospect
for a negotiated settlement and admitted that he did "not know
how to solve our problem in a manner which will be agreeable to
everybody." Without any clear ideas of his own, he placed his
faith in the president and his advisors to resolve the Vietnam
dilemma in a satisfactory way. He approved of Johnson's bombing
halt of October 1968 because he believed the president had access
to enough secret intelligence and informed advice to make a wise
judgment. "We are going to have to'trust the President and his
negotiators because they are doing their very best," 'he told one
concerned constituent. 21
Anderson had less faith that President Nixon could end the war
gracefully than he had placed in Lyndon Johnson. By early 1969,
he was also growing increasingly impatient and disillusioned with
American involvement in Vietnam. "I agree with you that this is
a bad war and that it should be ended," he wrote to a correspondent. "If some President doesn't stop it very shortly, the Congress
may do so. I will not mourn if that should happen." The New
Mexican supported Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" because he
thought it was a responsible path toward peace. The idea of
training and supplying South Vietnamese soldiers to nght their
own war was consistent with the position he had espoused in 1954,
and he opposed keeping Amedcan troops in Southeast Asia "just
to prop up the Thieugovernment." His only major objection to
Nixon's phased withdrawal was that it was not proceeding rapidly
enough. 22
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The April 1970 announcement that American forces were
moving into Cambodia caused Anderson to suspend his guarded
support for Nixon's Vietnam policies and shattered his belief in
presidential supremacy in foreign affairs. The Cambodian incursion, he remarked, "represented a dangerous departure" from
Vietnamization because it deepened American involvement in the
war. The letters that poured into his office from New Mexico
opposed Nixon's action by a margin of seven to one, but Anderson,
who had no intention of seeking another Senate term, was not
motivated by political factors in taking his position. He reacted as
he did because the Cambodian invasion persuaded him that the
United States had grievously blundered in its Vietnam policies.
"I agree with you we should not have sent our boys to Vietnam,"
he told one constituent. "I think we made a mistake." Regretting
that he "had been late in seeing the error of continued escalation"
and that he had consistently deferred to presidential authority in
foreign affairs, he favored measures that he hoped would hasten
the end of the war and check presidential abuse of power. 23
Anderson voted for an amendment to a foreign aid authorization
bill proposed by Senators John Sherman Cooper and Frank Church
that prohibited using funds to maintain U.S. combat forces in
Cambodia. The Cooper-Church amendment, he believed, would
prevent the president from initiating future military actions in
Cambodia. He also backed a measure introduced by Senators
George McGovern and Mark Hatfield to deny appropriations for
American troops in Vietnam after a specified date. Anderson COntended "that Congress must fulfill its obligation to the President
and to the people by assuring a prompt and definitive end to
American participation in the war." The most dramatic indication
of his disenchantment with allowing the president too much
latitude in foreign affairs and his determination to reaffirm rightful
congressional authority was his vote in favor of the War Powers
Bill in April I 972. By agreeing that the president's power to make
war should be closely monitored by Congress, he was sharply
departing from his previous view that restraining executive discretioh ih diplomatic mattersc()uld endanger 'the nation's welfare.:!'!
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The Vietnam war led Anderson to modify his thinking about
international affairs in other significant ways. Although he remained suspicious of the Soviet Union and concerned about the
spread of communism, he was no longer certain that firmness and
force were necessarily the best ways to deal with the communists.
When President Nixon resumed intensive bombing raids against
North Vietnam in April 1972, Anderson denounced him for
pursuing "an irresistible urge for 'action' as opposed to patient,
frustrating diplomacy." He no longer believed that communism
was monolithic and that all Marxist movements took their orders
from Moscow or Peking. He recognized the rivalry within the
communist bloc betWeen Russia and China, and also conceded that
the Vietnamese struggle was more a civil war than a part of an
international communist conspiracy. "The 1956 [sic] Geneva
accords were never intended to divide Vietnam into two nations,"
he wrote in 1970, "and so it is true that we are indeed involved in
a civil war in Asia." Anderson also lost faith in the soundness of
the dQmino theory and its assumption that the loss of one domino
could set off a chain of events that could undermine American
security.. He remarked to one war opponent after the Cambodian
crisis: "I agree with you that olir national interests are not served
by the war."25
In addition to precipitating a change in his outlook on current
foreign policy issues, the Vietnam war altered Anderson's perspective on historical events. When he published his memoirs in 1970,
he wrote of the early days of the cold war: "I realize better now
than I did then that we made important . contributions to the
creation of mutual hostility and fear." As for the 1945 cabinet
debate about sharing atomic information with the Soviet Union,
he commented: "I often wonder now what different tum our
relations with the Russians would have taken had Stimson's argument prevailed over mine. I certainly think we made our decision
t()() .cas.u.:al~y ~pd, with aquartercentury oFpersp€6tive to applyto
th~ m(nnept, I also think we were wrong in the decision we made."
Anderson. also .wonderedwhe~er. he "might· ·have . influenced
Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policies had he spoken out ag~iilstthe
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war instead of opting to "remain faithful to my friend, the President." He concluded, however, that he could not have swayed
Johnson because "Lyndon was a stubborn man and . . . was set
on having his way."26
Clinton P. Anderson's transformation from dedicated cold
warrior to Vietnam dove was not unique, but it was significant
nevertheless. Like most public officials not directly involved in
diplomatic affairs and the overwhelming majority of Americans,
he was usually preoccupied with matters of more immediate concern to him than foreign relations. When he was inevitably confronted with foreign policy problems, he generally relied on presi c
dential judgment and the continuing applicability of policies
formulated during the Truman years. The Vietnam war eroded
his faith in superior executive wisdom and his commitment to the
credos of the past. Anderson's protests against further escalation of
the Vietnam war, his votes to restrict presidential power, and his
revised historical perspective on the cold war did not assure the
emergence of a more judicious or successful American position in
world affairs. But the change in his views, along with a similar
metamorphosis in the thinking of millions of other Americans, did
signify a refusal to cling to doctrines devised in the late 1940S and
a willingness to seek a more flexible foreign policy that could
meet the demands of the vastly more complex world of the 1970s.
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